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Affect Theory͛s Alternatiǀe Genealogies: A Response to Ruth Leys  
 
Carolyn Pedwell, SSPSSR, University of Kent  
 
 
Despite what its title, ďluƌď aŶd editoƌial eŶdoƌseŵeŶts ŵight suggest, ‘uth LeǇs͛ The 
Ascent of Affect: Genealogy and Critique is not a genealogy of the ͚tuƌŶ to affeĐt͛ or a critical 
account of the emergence of affect theory across the humanities, social sciences and life 
sciences.  It is, rather, a post-war history of the ͚sĐieŶĐe of eŵotioŶ͛ focusing on 
mainstream, American, largely male, psychologists and philosophers investigating the 
relationship between feelings and facial expressions in human and non-human animals.  In 
its pursuit of the latter, it is rigorous, incisive and illuminating.  In its claim to the former, it is 
partial, dismissive and, at times, misguided - though not without critical food for thought for 
interdisciplinary affect and emotion studies.  In what follows, I summarise LeǇs͛ important 
arguments and insights before offering a more detailed consideration of her critique of 
affect theory.  
 
Before doing so, however, it might be useful to address my own disciplinary location and 
intellectual influences.  As a Cultural Studies scholar, my work is informed by the genealogy 
of affect in continental philosophy associated with Baruch Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze and Brian 
Massumi, as well as ŵoƌe ƌeĐeŶt ǁoƌk oŶ the ͚Đultuƌal politiĐs of eŵotioŶ͛ ďǇ sĐholaƌs suĐh 
as Eve Sedgwick, Sara Ahmed and Lauren Berlant.  Explicitly concerned with the nature and 
implications of interdisciplinary articulations of affect, my research on empathy and 
transnational politics integrates literature from the social sciences, humanities and life 
sciences.i  I have been interested, for instance, in the multiple layers of translation involved 
in politicising the ͚science of empathy͛, including the translation of neuroscientific research 
on mirror neurons into, on the one hand, the often neoliberal language of popular science 
and, on the other, into cultural theories of affect and transnational political praxis (2014: 
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Chapter 5).  LeǇs͛ (2011, 2017) analysis of the challenges of bringing together different 
epistemological and ontological frameworks for the study of emotion has been invaluable to 
this project in its careful attention to the ƌisks of ͚ŵis-tƌaŶslatioŶ͛ (see also Papoulias and 
Callard, 2010).  And yet, while Leys focuses mainly oŶ the pƌoďleŵs ǁith affeĐt theoƌǇ͛s 
selective appropriation of the neurosciences, my own work is more interested in what 
epistemological and ethical possibilities might be opened up through affective 
conversations across disciplinary boundaries – and indeed, what might be gained through 
translating the science of empathy otherwise.  It is from this perspective that I approach 
LeǇs͛ ŵost ƌeĐeŶt teǆt.          
 
Cognition, intentionality and the emotion sciences 
 
The Ascent of Affect offers a lucid and meticulously researched account of how, and with 
what theoretical, empirical and political implications, the work of the psychologist Silvan S. 
Tomkins came to inform the chief paradigm of the emotions sciences in the United States.  
In the 1960s, a ͚ĐogŶitiǀe͛ appƌoaĐh to emotion initially prevailed, with Richard S. Lazarus 
conducting a series of experiments that purported to indicate the primacy of cognitive 
͚appƌaisal͛ to emotional expression.  Over the next two decades, however, TomkiŶs͛ ͚ŶoŶ-
ĐogŶitiǀist͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe gained significant traction, becoming the mainstream position by the 
1980s.  As Leys outlines, ToŵkiŶs͛ ͚BasiĐ EŵotioŶs Model͛ posited a limited number of 
primary emotions that ĐoƌƌespoŶded ǁith ͚sigŶatuƌe faĐial eǆpƌessioŶs aŶd speĐifiĐ patteƌŶs 
of ďehaǀioƌal autoŶoŵiĐ ƌespoŶses͛ ;ϮϬϭϳ: ϮͿ.  DeǀelopiŶg ToŵkiŶs͛ appƌoaĐh thƌough 
laboratory research using photographs of posed facial expressions, Paul Ekman developed a 
͚ŶeuƌoĐultuƌal͛ theoƌǇ of emotion iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚soĐializatioŶ … can moderate facial movements 
according to Đultuƌal Ŷoƌŵs oƌ ͞displaǇ ƌules͟, but under certain conditions the innate 
eŵotioŶs ŵight Ŷeǀeƌtheless ͞leak out͛͟ (83-4).  Within this highly influential work, 
emotions are viewed as ͚paŶĐultuƌal ďehaǀioƌal-psychological responses that can be 
disĐhaƌged iŶ aŶ autoŵatiĐ, iŶǀoluŶtaƌǇ, ŶoŶĐogŶitiǀe fashioŶ ďǇ uŶleaƌŶed tƌiggeƌs͛ (7).  
 
From the early 1990s, the Ekman-Tomkins paradigm was subject to significant critiques, 
including those on the part of the psychologist James A. Russell and EkŵaŶ͛s foƌŵeƌ studeŶt 
Alan J. Fridlund.  In a key 1994 pieĐe aŶalǇsiŶg EkŵaŶ͛s photographic studies, for example, 
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‘ussell aƌgued that ͚the ƌesults ǁeƌe aƌtefaĐtual, depeŶdiŶg on forced-choice response 
formats and other problematic methods͛ that fundamentally undermined his ͚claims for the 
universalitǇ of ďasiĐ eŵotioŶs͛ ;LeǇs, ϮϬϭϳ: 19).  While such interventions might have 
profoundly diminished the scientific authority of the Tomkins-Ekman approach, this has not, 
Leys stresses, been the case.  Instead, leading scholars, such as the philosopher Paul 
Griffiths in What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (1995), 
continue to mobilise their research to define emotion in fundamentally non-cognitive, non-
intentional terms.  The Ascent of Affect elucidates several reasons for the continued success 
of the Tomkins-Ekman paradigm, including:  
 
Its ostensibly objective approach to the affects; its solidarity with evolutionary 
theories of the mind; the agreement between its assumptions about the 
independence of the affect system and cognition and the contemporary 
presuppositions about the modularity and encapsulation of brain functions; [and] 
the congruence between its image-based approach to the emotions and 
neuroimaging teĐhŶologies suĐh as PET aŶd fM‘I …   
 
Significantly, EkŵaŶ͛s ŵodel also appears to offer a solution to the problem of deception in 
everyday life by showing that ͚the ďodǇ ĐaŶŶot lie͛: within particular conditions ͚the 
eŵotioŶal tƌuth of ouƌ iŶŶeƌ states ǁill ďetƌaǇ itself͛ ;2017: 128, 23).  This is why EkŵaŶ ͚has 
played an influential role in federally funded post 9/11 surveillance research designed to 
fiŶd ǁaǇs to ideŶtifǇ teƌƌoƌists ďefoƌe theǇ ĐaŶ aĐt͛ ;ϮϯͿ.  With this example Leys begins to 
highlight what is at stake in the emotion sciences debates and why it matters politically, 
materially and ethically which account of emotion is taken to be scientifically proven and 
͚ĐoƌƌeĐt͛.  
 
In this context, Leys situates herself decisively against the Tomkins-Ekman paradigm and 
͚ŶoŶ-iŶteŶtioŶal͛ accounts of affect more generally.  Nonetheless, she does not align herself 
uncritically with the cognitivist theories of Lazarus and other appraisal psychologists such as 
Magda Arnold.  While Lazarus usefully demonstrated the importance of ͚appƌaisals, ďeliefs 
aŶd ĐopiŶg stǇles͛ to physiological and emotional responses, Leys suggests, his work 
nonetheless presupposed ͚a gap or separation between the person and the world, which it 
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is the function of cognition or appraisal to close, with the result that our emotional 
evaluations of objeĐts aƌe Ŷot diƌeĐt aŶd iŵŵediate ďut iŶdiƌeĐt aŶd uŶŵediated͛ ;ϮϬϭϳ: 19, 
132).  PhilosophiĐallǇ, LeǇs fiŶds ŵoƌe palataďle Phil HutĐhiŶsoŶ͛s ͚eŵďodied-world-taking 
cognitivisŵ͛, which ŵaiŶtaiŶs that ͚peƌĐeptual eǆpeƌieŶĐe is ĐoŶĐeptual thƌough aŶd 
through͛ (13).  Empirically, she advocates FƌidluŶd͛s ďehaǀioural ecology and its 
understanding of facial movements as ͚iŶteŶtioŶal ďehaǀioƌs͛ that ͚eǀolǀed iŶ oƌdeƌ to 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ŵotiǀes͛ iŶ oŶgoiŶg iŶterpersonal transactions (19).  Throughout The Ascent 
of Affect, Leys offers a fascinating analysis of the ongoing scientific disagreement and 
controversy within the emotion sciences and makes a compelling case for moving decisively 
ďeǇoŶd a ͚ďasiĐ eŵotioŶs͛ appƌoaĐh.     
 
In her final chapter, Leys turns her attention to what she calls the ͚Ŷeǁ affeĐt theoƌists͛ – in 
particular, scholars in the humanities and social sciences, such as Sedgwick, Massumi, 
William Connolly, Nigel Thrift and John Protevi, who draw on evolutionary psychology and 
the neurosciences to inform their analyses of affect.  What fundamentally links these critical 
theorists with many contemporary psychologists and neuroscientists, she argues, is their 
shared emphasis on the non-intentionality of affect and consequent devaluation of 
cognition, interpretation and meaning.  However, in selectively mobilising the emotion 
sciences to support theiƌ ǀieǁ ͚that ĐogŶitioŶ oƌ thiŶkiŶg Đoŵes ͞too late͟ foƌ ƌeasoŶs, 
beliefs, intentions and meanings to play the role in action and behavior usually accorded to 
theŵ͛ (2017: 315), affect theorists offer questionable readings of experimental research, 
while failing to acknowledge the ways in which Tomkins-Ekman paradigm has been 
critiqued.  Ultimately, Leys contends, affect studies replaces ͚ideologiĐal disagƌeeŵeŶts͛ 
with ͚diffeƌeŶĐes iŶ ouƌ feeliŶg oƌ ďodies͛ in a way that generates ͚indifference to political 
aŶd ethiĐal dispute͛ (2017: 315, 345) and devalues reasoned argument in socio-political life.   
 
With these arguments, Leys echoes her previous critiques of affeĐt theoƌǇ͛s problematic 
͚appƌopƌiatioŶ͛ of the neurosciences (2011) to raise challenging questions concerning the 
perils and possibilities of interdisciplinary scholarship across the life sciences and the 
humanities and social sciences.  The Ascent of Affect͛s incisive unpacking of the problems 
with the Tomkins-Ekman paradigm, as well as the limitations of cybernetic accounts which 
ƌefoƌŵulated ͚ŵeŶtatioŶ is stƌiĐtlǇ ĐoŵputatioŶal-Đoƌpoƌeal teƌŵs͛ ;ϮϬϭϳ: ϭϯϴͿ, should 
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generate pause for thought within critical theory – and particularly approaches that figure 
affect and cognition as folloǁiŶg ͚diffeƌeŶt logiĐs͛ aŶd peƌtaiŶiŶg ͚to diffeƌeŶt oƌdeƌs͛ 
(Massumi, 1995: 88).  Nonetheless, as I suggest below, there are also partialities and 
teŶsioŶs iŶ LeǇs͛ account, which are linked to her desire to assess scholars of affect via the 
same framework she establishes to address the emotion sciences.   
 
Affective contexts and contestations   
 
The Ascent of Affect is structured by a number of overarching oppositions, namely 
͚ĐogŶitiǀe͛ ǀs. ͚ŶoŶ-ĐogŶitiǀe͛, ͚iŶteŶtioŶal͛ ǀs ͚ŶoŶ-iŶteŶtioŶal͛ and, more broadly, ͚good 
sĐieŶĐe͛ ǀs. ͚ďad sĐieŶĐe͛.  These ďiŶaƌies fuƌŶish LeǇs͛ genealogy with analytical clarity and, 
in her reading, mirror the bipolar nature of persistent debates within the emotion sciences.  
The problem with this approach, however, is that it creates an imperative to locate each of 
the key perspectives and scholars addressed on one or the other side of the binaries; instead 
of exploring, for example, how they may exceed or transform them in generative ways.  
This, I want to argue, leads Leys to exaggerate key analytical claims and to frame critiques of 
various perspectives and fields in overly reductive terms.   
 
For example, after positioning affect theory as fundamentally ͚ŶoŶ-cognitiǀe͛ aŶd ͚ŶoŶ-
iŶteŶtioŶal͛, she portrays its proponents as ǁaŶtiŶg to ͚get ƌid of the ŶotioŶ of ŵeaŶiŶg oƌ 
belief or intention or interpretation altogether͛ ;ŵǇ italiĐs, Ϯ017: 345).  Yet, such sweeping 
claims seem more indicative of anxieties within philosophical and political thought 
concerning a possible loss of the authority traditionally attached to ͚ƌeasoŶed argument͛, 
than they do of the state of the art within interdisciplinary affect and emotion studies.  
Rather than seeking to evacuate cognition, intentionality or meaning from analysis of 
affective and social life, I will argue, critical affect scholars have sought to re-think the 
meaning of key concepts such as ͚feeliŶg͛, ͚thought͛ and ͚ageŶĐǇ͛ aŶd to challenge critical 
theory to think in more relational, processual and speculative ways.   
 
Relatedly, Leys fails to address in adequate depth the significant epistemological differences 
that have characterised the emotion sciences, on the one hand, and critical theory, on the 
other – particularly in the 1990s, a crucial decade for her analysis.  If, in 1994, Fridlund was 
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takiŶg oŶ a ͚highlǇ eŶtƌeŶĐhed positioŶ͛ iŶ evolutionary psychology when he critiqued the 
Tomkins-Ekman paradigm and its non-cognitivist thrust (2017: 19), the same could clearly 
not be said for critical theory in the humanities and social sciences.  In its poststructuralist 
focus on discourse, language and signification, as well as its lingering investment in 
psychoanalysis, critical theory in the 1990s was very much centred on processes of 
cognition, interpretation and meaning-making.  Thus, while Leys portrays Sedgwick as 
ignorant of the state of AŵeƌiĐaŶ psǇĐhologǇ iŶ ďelieǀiŶg ͚she ǁas deliǀeƌiŶg Ŷeǁs aďout 
the relevance of ToŵkiŶs͛ sĐieŶtifiĐ ideas to ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ deďates aďout the eŵotioŶs͛ 
(2017: 2), the point is that invoking Tomkins had a very different meaning and impact for 
Sedgwick within critical theory than it did for Fridlund or Griffiths within the emotion 
sciences in the mid-1990s.  
  
In ͚“haŵe iŶ the CǇďeƌŶetiĐ Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins͛ (1995), part of Sedgwick and 
Adaŵ FƌaŶk͛s objective was to unsettle what they saw as some of the dominant 
epistemological habits in poststructuralist theory.  After Freud, Derrida and Foucault, as well 
as ͚feŵiŶisŵ͛, they argue, it has become routine to assume: 1) that ͚doing justice to 
diffeƌeŶĐe … aŶd the possiďilitǇ of ĐhaŶge͛ requires distance fƌoŵ ͚aŶǇ ďiologiĐal ďasis͛; ϮͿ 
that human language offeƌs ͚the ŵost pƌoduĐtiǀe … models for understanding 
representation͛; and 3) that deconstructing binaries (i.e. subject/object, self/other, 
active/passive) is ͚aŶ uƌgeŶt aŶd iŶteƌŵiŶaďle task͛ in pursuit of social transformation (1995: 
496-7).  In Sedgwick aŶd FƌaŶk͛s view, these ͚heuristic habits͛ tend to reproduce 
stƌuĐtuƌalisŵs͛ ƌeĐouƌse to ͚sǇŵďolizatioŶ thƌough ďiŶaƌǇ paiƌiŶgs of eleŵeŶts͛ in ways that 
flatten the embodied, affective and material complexity of human behaviour and socio-
political life (1995: 497).  Crucially, ǁhat ToŵkiŶs͛ ǁoƌk offeƌed these scholars in the mid-
1990s was not a comprehensive framework to be transplanted into the present intact, but 
rather a vision formulated at the Đusp of the ͚ĐǇďeƌŶetiĐ fold͛ that might enable critical 
scholars to imagine how the transition from structuralism to post-structuralism could have 
happened differently (1995: 509) – how we might have arrived at (and could still create) 
modes of theory that are less cut off from the life sciences, less focused on exposing 
essentialisms and more able to connect with complexity and change as it is unfolding.   
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Similarly, in the ͚The AutoŶoŵǇ of AffeĐt͛ ;ϭϵϵϱͿ, Massuŵi sought to address what he saw 
as the limits of post-structural theories of linguistic signification in grappling with questions 
of materiality, agency and transformation.  He is particularly concerned with how 
poststƌuĐtuƌalisŵ͛s ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg reliance on structuralist frameworks superimposes a pre-set 
system of regularities onto social and material life that makes it difficult to account for 
novelty, emergence and change.  Furthermore, iŶ Massuŵi͛s view, ĐƌitiĐal theoƌǇ͛s dominant 
constructivist assumption that ͚eǀeƌǇthiŶg, iŶĐludiŶg Ŷatuƌe, is ĐoŶstƌuĐted iŶ disĐouƌse͛– 
means that it can only engage with the non-huŵaŶ as a ͚ĐoŶstƌuĐt of the huŵaŶ͛.  
Consequently, it is unable to allow for the possibility of ͚Ŷatuƌe as haǀiŶg its oǁŶ dǇŶaŵisŵ͛ 
(1995: 100); modes of organisation and becoming, that is, that, cannot be captured by 
human systems of signification.  In bringing together the philosophy of Spinoza and Deleuze 
with the neuroscientific research of Benjamin Libet and others, Massumi offers another 
possible framework for encountering material life – one that provides a more relational 
understanding of human agency but also, and perhaps most vitally, can account for 
processes of emergence and potentiality that work both above and below the level of ͚the 
suďjeĐt͛.  
  
Significantly, while Massumi highlights the limitations of dominant social constructivist 
approaches to analysis, he, like Sedgwick, does not dismiss ͚the ĐoŶsideƌaďle deĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe 
ǁoƌk that has ďeeŶ effeĐtiǀelǇ Đaƌƌied out ďǇ poststƌuĐtuƌalisŵ͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϴϴͿ.  Indeed, 
Massumi presents the alternative affective ͚ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ͛ he offers as what critical theory 
ŵight ďe eŶƌiĐhed ďǇ thƌough ͚integrating͛; ƌatheƌ than what should simply replace existing 
modes of analysis (1995: 187).  Contrary to Leys͛ accusations, Massumi͛s poiŶt here is not 
that attention to signification or meaning is irrelevant when it comes to analysis of human 
behaviour, the workings of visual media, or the manufacturing of political consent, but 
rather that accounts of these pheŶoŵeŶa ͚aƌe incomplete if they operate only on the 
seŵaŶtiĐ oƌ seŵiotiĐ leǀel͛ ;my italics, 187).  What is important to emphasise genealogically, 
then, is that, in the mid-1990s, Sedgwick and Massumi each turn to the life sciences - among 
other resources ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe ͚Ŷot the usual oŶes foƌ Đultuƌal theoƌǇ͛ ;Massuŵi, ϭϵϵϱ: ϴϴͿ - to 
challenge an emphasis on linguistic signification at a time that it was dominant in social and 
cultural theory.  Instead of rejecting discursive and constructivist forms of analysis, they 
sought to highlight the limitations associated with assuming that these are the only (or 
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always the most suitable) frameworks for exploring social and political life.  
 
There are also, however, salient differences between Sedgwick and Massumi that deserve 
genealogical attention.  In thinking through ToŵkiŶs͛ ͚TheoƌǇ of BasiĐ EŵotioŶs͛, Sedgwick 
and Frank are concerned primarily with affect as it pertains to intersubjective relations.  
They thus refer to ͚affeĐts͛ ;pluƌalͿ aŶd highlight the ͚Ƌualitatiǀe diffeƌeŶĐes aŵoŶg affeĐts͛, 
such as, for example, the difference ͚ďeiŶg, say, amused, being disgusted, being ashamed, 
aŶd ďeiŶg eŶƌaged͛ ;ϭϵϵϱ: ϱϭϰͿ.  For Massumi, and others working in the Spinoza-Deleuze 
tradition, however, ͚affeĐt͛ ;more often in the singular) is precisely that which ͚escapes 
ĐoŶfiŶeŵeŶt͛ iŶ human bodies, subjectivities and relations (1995: 96).  It ƌefeƌs to ͚aŶ eŶtiƌe, 
ǀital aŶd ŵodulatiŶg field of ŵǇƌiad ďeĐoŵiŶgs aĐƌoss the huŵaŶ aŶd ŶoŶhuŵaŶ͛ ;Gƌegg 
and Seigworth, 2010: 6).  While Leys understands the Tomkins-Ekman and Spinoza-Deleuze 
paradigms as linked by their iŶsisteŶĐe oŶ the ͚ŶoŶ-iŶteŶtioŶalitǇ͛ of affeĐt, heƌ focus on 
whether theories of affect are ͚cognitive/iŶteŶtioŶal͛ or ͚non-cognitive/non-iŶteŶtioŶal͛ 
misses how, for many critical thinkers, affect is precisely that which radically exceeds ͚the 
huŵaŶ͛ – and therefore it may not make sense to assess such theories using psychological 
terms referring to human-centred terms and processes.   
 
However, while Massumi (1995, 2002) famously figured affect as ͚uŶŵediated͛, 
͚autoŶoŵous͛ aŶd ͚pƌe-cognitive͛, many other leading scholars in the field theorise affect, 
cognition and mediation as inherently interlinked.  For example, in The Affect Theory 
Reader, Melissa Gƌegg aŶd Gƌeg “eigǁoƌth aƌgue that ͚affeĐt aŶd ĐogŶitioŶ aƌe Ŷeǀeƌ fullǇ 
separable – if for no other reason than thought itself is a ďodǇ, eŵďodied͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ: Ϯ-3) and in 
The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Sara Ahmed calls attention to the problems within the long 
history of attempting to separate sensation and cognition as if ͚theǇ Đould ďe ͞eǆpeƌieŶĐed͟ 
as distinct realms of huŵaŶ ͞eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛͟ (2004: 6).  More recently, in Encountering Affect: 
Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions, Ben Anderson argues that ͚affeĐtiǀe life is alǁaǇs-
alƌeadǇ ŵediated͛ aŶd insists that ͚ǁe ŵust paǇ atteŶtioŶ to hoǁ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs fuŶĐtioŶ 
affeĐtiǀelǇ aŶd hoǁ affeĐtiǀe life is iŵďued ǁith ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶs͛ ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϭϯ-14).  Indeed, 
while The Ascent of Affect portrays affect theoƌǇ as fuŶdaŵeŶtallǇ ͚ŶoŶ-iŶteŶtioŶal͛ in 
orientation, the mainstream approach in the field is aƌguaďlǇ ŵuĐh Đloseƌ to LeǇs͛ own 
position than she acknowledges.  Unlike Leys, and many in the emotion sciences, however, 
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critical scholars of affect have tended to focus less on the imperative to determine 
conclusively what emotion is and more on exploring what affect, emotion and feeling do.    
 
A dedicated genealogy of interdisciplinary theories of affect would involve unpacking these 
kinds of philosophical differences - addressing not only what distinguishes the Tomkins-
Ekman and Spinoza-Deleuze routes, but also the significance of a range of other intellectual 
sources for critical scholars of affect and emotion – including, but not limited to, Charles 
Darwin, Karl Marx, William James, John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, Susanne Langer, A. N. 
Whitehead, Sigmund Freud, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Hursserl, Melanie Klein, 
Erving Goffman, Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, Frantz Fanon, Raymond Williams, Luce 
Irigaray, Audre Lorde and Sylvia Wynter.  In this vein, it worth noting that, although this was 
Ŷot heƌ pƌojeĐt, LeǇs ǁould haǀe told a ǀeƌǇ diffeƌeŶt stoƌǇ aďout ͚asĐeŶt of affeĐt͛ as a 
concept, approach and field had she focused on a different (or more diverse) collection of 
figures – and particularly feminist, queer and decoloninal thinkers – many of whom 
approach the life sciences differently to Massumi, Thrift, Connolly and other affect theorists 
who Leys treats as representative of the field.  Lisa Blackman (2012), for example, in a 
genealogical analysis that brings together social psychology, physiology, psychoanalysis, 
sociology and media theory, complicates associations of affect with non-intentionality and 
an overly mechanical view of automatism, offering an account of sensation and cognition as 
iŵďƌiĐated ͚all the ǁaǇ doǁŶ͛.    
 
Returning to the 1995 essays by Sedgwick and Massumi on which Leys anchors her critique 
(and particularly her accusations of ͚ďad sĐieŶĐe͛), it is important to acknowledge that 
neither scholar presents the scientific work they cite as ͚eǀideŶĐe͛ to support the ͚tƌuth͛ or 
͚aĐĐuƌaĐǇ͛ of their claims.  Massumi refers to neuroscientific experiments he discusses as 
͚stoƌies͛ – which he uses alongside other kinds of ͚stories͛ to develop a new vocabulary of 
affect to inform cultural studies.  In turn, Sedgwick and Frank acknowledge ToŵkiŶs͛ ͚highlǇ 
suspeĐt sĐieŶtisŵ͛ and emphasise that ͚[Ǉ]ou doŶ͛t haǀe to ďe loŶg out of theoƌǇ 
kiŶdeƌgaƌteŶ to ŵake ŵiŶĐeŵeat of … a psychology that depends on the separate existence 
of eight ;oŶlǇ soŵetiŵes it͛s ŶiŶeͿ distiŶĐt affeĐts haƌdǁiƌed iŶto the huŵaŶ ďiologiĐal 
sǇsteŵ͛ (1995: 497).  Yet, in highlighting how easy it would be for a critical theorist - or 
indeed a contemporary ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ ƌeadeƌ͛ - to deŵolish ToŵkiŶs͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌk, part of their 
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aim is to illustrate how automatic, and thus potentially stultifying, particular epistemological 
habits of ͚ĐƌitiƋue͛ have become – to the point where it is no longer possible to entertain 
what might be generative about a given perspective once the red flag of biological 
essentialism has been raised (1995: 507).  What is at stake in both pieces, then, is not a 
positivist claim to truth, but rather a speculative attempt to open up existing modes of 
critical theory by thinking, writing, and affecting differently.   
 
To be clear, my intention here, as I have argued elsewhere (Pedwell, 2014: Chapter 5), is not 
to suggest that ͚aŶǇthiŶg goes͛ oƌ to adǀoĐate a ďouŶdless ƌelatiǀisŵ ǁith ƌespeĐt to critical 
theoƌǇ͛s ŵoďilisatioŶ of the life sĐieŶĐes.  It is, however, to refrain from shutting down or 
regulating too quickly or rigidly the imaginative, critical and political possibilities of diverse 
engagements affect in the midst of the multiple relationalities inter-linking the assemblages 
ǁe Đall ͚sĐieŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚Đultuƌe͛.  It is also to explore how the meaning of scientific ͚aĐĐuƌaĐǇ͛ 
itself remains open to contextual contestation and may be continually redefined through 
interdisciplinary interventions.  From this perspective, judging the value of critical 
engagements with affect on the basis of whether they are ͚ƌight͛/͛ǁƌoŶg͛, 
͚accurate͛/͛iŶaĐĐurate͛, or whether they constitute ͚a ŵistake͛ ;LeǇs, ϮϬϭϳ: 25), is not the 
most generous or generative intellectual approach.  As I have suggested, it imposes a 
positivist framework onto critical theory which misses the explicitly imaginative and 
speculative nature of many of these interventions - that is, their vital efforts to draw 
͚ĐƌeatiǀelǇ oŶ diffeƌeŶt foƌŵs of kŶoǁledge to ask what if one conceived of the world in this 
ǁaǇ͛ as a ͚heuƌistiĐ foƌ iŶŶoǀatioŶ͛ ;italics mine, Gibbs, 2010: 189, 203).   
 
At the same time, however, it would seem that many of the questions concerning 
consciousness, agency, relationality and more-than-human entanglements which affect 
theorists have been exploring for decades, are now, in important ways, no longer 
speculative.  For instance, as Patricia Clough et al discuss, with ͚adaptive algorithmic 
architectures͛ coming to play a greater role in the parsing of big data, new technologies are 
͚Ŷo loŶgeƌ sloǁed ďǇ the pƌoĐess oƌ pƌaĐtiĐe of tƌaŶslatiŶg ďaĐk to huŵaŶ ĐoŶsĐiousŶess͛ 
(2014: 148).  Significantly, such algorithmic environments are also providing resources for 
͚the iŶaŶiŵate to ďeĐoŵe seŶtieŶt͛ ;“ledge, 2013 cited in Clough et al, 2014: 146).  These 
techno-social developments do not signal the irrelevance or withering away of human 
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cognition or interpretation.  But they do point to the need for ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌethiŶkiŶg of 
the huŵaŶ aŶd of huŵaŶ eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to ͚networks of media technologies that 
operate predominately, if not almost entirely, outside the scope of human modes of 
awareness͛ (Hansen, 2015: 2, 5).   
 
Against this background – and indeed her own account of the persistent scientific debates 
and uncertainties concerning cognition and intention in biological life - LeǇs͛ concluding 
recourse to, and defence of, ͚iŶteŶtioŶalitǇ͛, ͚ƌatioŶalitǇ͛ aŶd ͚ƌeasoŶ͛ ;as if these terms were 
uncontested and unchanging) is curious.  Rather than doubling down on the rightful place of 
͚reasoned argument͛ in socio-political life, is our task as critical scholars not to understand 
the complexity of the above terms and how their meanings and status may be evolving via 
transformations in our psychological, sociological, political, economic, technological and 
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